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On the evening of February 11, 1927, the tall, gaunt figure of Lamine 
Senghor strode to the podium at the inaugural meeting of the League against 
Imperialism (LAI). The LAI was one of the interwar communist movement’s 
foremost attempts to forge a united anti-colonial front of nationalists, 
communists and socialists, uniting white Europeans and colonial subjects from 
around the globe. Yet, like other such initiatives, it proved short-lived. 
 Senghor was a decorated Senegalese veteran of World War I, who had 
risen to prominence in mid-1920s as a leading figure in the emerging 
communist-inspired anti-colonial movement in France. In his rousing speech 
at the LAI meeting in Brussels, he denounced imperialism as a modern form of 
slavery and called on the workers of the world to unite and overthrow the 
entire capitalist-imperialist system. His call for a world of “no more slaves” 
applied equally to the exploited of the colonies and the working class of the 
industrial nations. 
 He reserved particular scorn for France’s treatment of its colonial 
soldiers during and after the war — a central factor in his own radicalization. 
His views on the suffering endured by colonial soldiers had extra authority 
given his own status as a “war invalid,” the self-description he typically used 
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on the official public documents produced by the movements to which he 
belonged. In April 1917, his battalion of the tirailleurs sénégalais [West African 
infantrymen] had been gassed near Verdun, and Senghor had lost one of his 
lungs — an injury from which he never fully recovered. 
 By all accounts, the Brussels speech was received rapturously by the 
delegates gathered at the Château d’Egmont. In many photographs from the 
Congress, Senghor is clearly the center of attention: other delegates drape their 
arms around his shoulders, broad grins etched on their faces. He was one of 
the stars of the show. A posed photograph of Senghor in profile, fist clenched 
standing at a lectern was reproduced in the official proceedings and was used 
to illustrate various articles over the months to come, including pieces in The 
Crisis and The Survey (the latter penned by Roger Baldwin, founder of the 
ACLU). 
 Lamine Senghor thus seemed poised to become a leading figure of the 
nascent anti-colonial movement. In an alternative timeline, the staged 
photograph from Brussels might have attained the radical chic of the romantic 
portraits of Che Guevara that would adorn the walls of so many student bedsits 
in a later period. But before 1927 was over, Senghor was dead, as the dreadful 
injuries he had suffered during the war finally caught up with him. Yet his 
political activity in his final three years remains full of lessons. His life as a 
militant illustrates the complex ways in which issues of race, class and anti-
colonialism were intertwined in this era — a telling case study of the 
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opportunities and dangers of intercolonial co-operation for black groups in the 
interwar period. 
 
Recruited for the Slaughter 
Senghor first came to public attention when he appeared as a witness for 
the defense in a libel trial that centered on African troops’ contribution to the 
French war effort. In October 1924, a Paris-based black newspaper, Les 
Continents, had published an article in which Blaise Diagne, MP for the four 
communes of the French colony in Senegal, was accused by celebrated French 
Caribbean novelist René Maran of having received “a certain commission for 
each soldier recruited” to take part in the war. Late in the conflict, Diagne had 
been sent to West Africa by prime minister Georges Clemenceau to recruit 
more African troops. The thinly veiled aim of his mission was to try and finally 
bring the war to an end while limiting the further loss of white French soldiers. 
Diagne’s success in recruiting 80,000 troops made him a hero both in France 
and in its African colonies, where locals could hardly believe their eyes that a 
black African was being greeted with the pomp and ceremony usually reserved 
for white dignitaries. But by the time of the libel trial, a growing number of 
voices on the Left and in the black community were beginning to question what 
they perceived as Diagne’s cozy relationship with the colonial establishment. 
 The Parisian media was thrilled at the whiff of scandal that clung to the 
case. But, more significantly, the trial placed the politics of France’s black 
colonial populations at the forefront of public debate — in particular the issue 
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of colonial troops’ participation in the war effort. Lamine Senghor’s testimony 
before the court presented the African colonial infantryman — the tirailleur 
sénégalais — as a man radicalized by his experiences who would now devote 
himself to denouncing colonial injustice. Shortly after the trial, Senghor wrote 
that: “Instead of attempting to prove precisely how much the great slave trader 
[Diagne] received for each Senegalese he recruited, they should have brought 
before him a whole procession of those blinded and mutilated in the war. … 
All of these victims would have spat in his face the infamy of the mission that 
he had undertaken.” 
 A constant refrain in Senghor’s speeches and writings was the iniquity 
and double standards involved in the treatment of colonial veterans, and, in 
particular, their military pensions. As he stated in his Brussels speech: “You 
have all seen that, during the war, as many Negroes as possible were recruited 
and led off to be slaughtered. … The Negro youth are now more clear-sighted. 
We know and are deeply aware that, when we are needed, to lay down our 
lives or to do hard labor, then we are French; but when it’s a question of giving 
us rights, we are no longer French, we are Negroes.” Senghor’s position as a 
“war invalid” opened up a space within 1920s France in which radical ideas 
could be given a hearing. Could a man who had loyally served France, 
sacrificing his health, be so readily dismissed as an enemy of the state? 
 
Communist Anti-Colonialism 
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Senghor had been pressed to appear as a witness in the trial by the 
committee of the Intercolonial Union (UIC), a group that he had only recently 
joined. The colonial archives reveal, with no little irony, that he had initially 
been pushed to register as a member of the UIC by the secret police of the 
Ministry for the Colonies (the infamous CAI). It appears that it recruited him 
as an informer in mid-1924, after his white French wife wrote to the Ministry 
in search of financial aid amidst Senghor’s worsening health condition. Yet, 
within months, this gambit had backfired spectacularly, as the events 
surrounding the trial precipitated a genuine radicalization of his political 
beliefs. 
 The UIC was ostensibly an independent group run by and for 
representatives of the colonized peoples. In reality, it was controlled by the 
Colonial Studies Committee of the French Communist Party (PCF), and was 
launched within months of this party’s historic split from the Socialists at the 
Tours Congress in late 1920. Nguyen ai Quoc, the future Ho Chi Minh, was the 
sole colonized voice heard in the debates in Tours, and he would become one 
of the UIC’s most active members in its early stages. Yet, while the UIC was 
designed to demonstrate PCF commitment to the Communist International’s 
anti-colonial agenda, PCF support for the UIC and the anti-colonial cause was 
inconsistent, to say the least.  By 1923, a frustrated Nguyen ai Quoc had 
departed for Moscow, and, from the mid-to-late 1920s, the UIC began to split 
into separate national, regional and ethnic movements for independence that 
often sought to keep the PCF at arm’s length.  
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Nonetheless, in late 1924, the UIC was still attempting to widen its 
appeal to more colonized groups in France, and Lamine Senghor’s rise to 
prominence provided an opportunity to reach out to the growing sub-Saharan 
African community. At the same time, the PCF was anxious to ensure that the 
UIC’s leaders were all given an “appropriate” political education. In 1925, the 
PCF thus opened a “Colonial School” for its growing band of colonized 
activists in the UIC, designed to improve their knowledge of Marxist ideology. 
Very few activists attended the classes and the ‘school’ closed after a few 
months but, while its doors were open, Senghor was one of the most assiduous 
student. His writing for the UIC’s newspaper Le Paria [“The Pariah”] bears the 
imprint of this ideological training. 
 The 1924-25 campaign against France’s colonial war in the Rif 
mountains of Morocco was the arena in which Senghor would hone his famed 
skills as an orator. This short-lived but fascinating experiment — in which UIC 
members played a central role — saw French Communism finally attempt to 
prove its internationalist, anti-colonial credentials to an increasingly impatient 
Comintern, which regularly berated the PCF for failing to tackle French 
imperialism. Scholars have justifiably argued that the PCF hierarchy was not 
fully committed to the Rif campaign, which it largely perceived as a form of 
gesture politics that might appease the Comintern. There were, however, 
important individuals within the campaign — not least Jacques Doriot, head of 
the PCF’s Colonial Commission, and Paul Vaillant-Couturier, editor of the PCF 
newspaper L’Humanité — who appeared committed to the anti-colonial cause. 
 7 
Equally, it would be misleading to suggest that the campaign solely interested 
a few figures in the PCF hierarchy. For the message that the struggle of the 
colonized was also the struggle of the proletariat could rally significant 
numbers within the broad workers’ movement. French Socialists and the 
League for the Rights of Man often spoke on issues related to racism and the 
need to “reform” the colonial system but they did not offer the same political 
space that the PCF was here opening up, even if only temporarily, for an 
explicitly anti-colonial cause. Two Communist rallies at Luna Park in the Paris 
suburbs in May and November 1925 attracted crowds of over 15,000, while in 
August of the same year 60,000 attended a huge anti-war rally in the Parisian 
suburb of Clichy at which Senghor appeared. 
 The Clichy rally powerfully illustrates, however, the limits of the PCF’s 
vision of its “partnership” with the colonized subjects of the UIC. The crowd 
was addressed by Marcel Cachin and other members of the PCF hierarchy, but 
there was no speaking role for Lamine Senghor or other members of the UIC. 
As reported by L’Humanité, Senghor did appear before the massed crowd arm-
in-arm with an unnamed “Arab” in a choreographed display of inter-racial, 
communist-inspired unity. But the symbolism of the scene was all too 
apparent: although Senghor and the UIC might play a useful role in the 
political theater of the campaign, the masterminds remained the white, French 
leadership of the PCF. 
Amongst the PCF figures who appeared most committed to the anti-
colonial cause, we should take particular note of the contribution of Paul 
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Vaillant-Couturier and the novelist, Henri Barbusse, who would later deliver 
the opening address at the Brussels Congress of the League against 
Imperialism. Both men had fought in World War I and had gravitated towards 
Communism via the Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants 
(ARAC), a virulently anti-war veterans’ organization. It is possible, though not 
proven, that Senghor may have encountered these prominent PCF members 
through ARAC; at the very least, it seems clear that their shared experience as 
war veterans created a bond between them. 
 After loyally serving the PCF and the UIC throughout the Rif campaign, 
Senghor gradually came to resent the limited space the Communist movement 
devoted to black questions in general as well as to his own marginalized status. 
There were only so many times he could accept the non-speaking role or being 
asked to deliver the “fraternal salute” of his black brothers to PCF gatherings. 
Apparently, the final straw came when the PCF was invited to send two 
representatives to the Congress of Black Workers in Chicago in October 1925. 
They selected Senghor and the Antillean lawyer Max Bloncourt but, at the last 
minute, informed them that they would have to pay for the journey out of their 
own pockets. When Senghor objected, it was suggested that he either work his 
passage to America or stow away: he refused. Senghor decided that in order to 
promote the interests of black people, it was necessary to create independent 
black organizations, and in early 1926 with the creation of the Committee for 
the Defense of the Negro Race (CDRN), that is just what he did. 
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Black Independence? 
 Senghor’s decision to leave the UIC appeared to assert the primacy of 
race over class. As with so much of Senghor’s career as a militant, however, 
appearances could be deceptive, with genuine and potentially contradictory 
motives hidden in a tangled web of ideological leanings, personal connections, 
gut feelings, and cunning political tactics. There were very real tensions 
between Senghor and the PCF, but there are also ample reasons to believe that 
any break with his Communist allies was largely strategic: not least amongst 
these is the fact that Senghor announced the creation of his new movement in 
an article, “The Negroes have Awoken” (with its conscious but 
unacknowledged echoes of the discourse of Marcus Garvey), in Le Paria in 
April 1926. It is difficult to imagine the UIC and their Communist handlers 
permitting a declaration of black independence within one of their own 
publications for anything other than strategic reasons: after all, the mid-1920s 
PCF was not renowned for its tolerance of dissenting internal voices. 
 After the CDRN’s creation in early 1926, Senghor crisscrossed France in 
a successful recruitment drive seeking to draw members of emerging black 
collectives, often constructed on an ethnic or regional basis, into a single black 
movement. Visiting the port towns of Marseilles, Bordeaux, Le Havre and the 
major colonial military base at Fréjus (where trainee African officers were a 
primary target of his propaganda), he had, by late 1926, recruited — the CAI 
estimated — close to 900 members, from among a black population then 
numbered at less than 20,000. 
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Indicative of Senghor’s influence was his meeting with Claude McKay, 
one of the most rebellious figures of the Harlem Renaissance, whom he 
encountered in Marseilles during his recruitment tour. While various 
commentators have dismissed Senghor as a hardline communist, McKay 
instantly recognized the hybrid nature of his politics, the fraught and complex 
attempt to marry left-wing thought and black radicalism: “He was a tall, lean 
intelligent Senegalese and his ideas were a mixture of African nationalism and 
international Communism,” McKay wrote appreciatively in his memoir, A 
Long Way from Home. 
 For its part, CDRN was a broad church in which Senghor sought to bring 
together both politically moderate and more radical members of the black 
community in France while also reaching out to subjects in the colonies, 
primarily through the circulation of the movement’s newspaper (typically sent 
overseas in small packets with sympathetic sailors). It utilized the language of 
France’s humanitarian, abolitionist tradition, mixed with the language of black 
pride that had been made popular by Marcus Garvey. 
 By early 1927, however, the broad coalition that had come together 
within the CDRN was already beginning to fragment. The first issue of its 
newspaper, La Voix des Nègres [The Voice of the Negroes] proudly and 
insistently proclaimed unity. But the CDRN was in fact in the middle of a long 
and protracted schism that would a few months later lead to its break-up, with 
Senghor and his fellow radicals deserting en masse to create the League for the 
Defense of the Negro Race (LDRN). The split in the organization was the result 
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of complex personal, political and cultural issues but appears primarily to have 
divided the CDRN on ideological lines with the more assimilationist members 
remaining within a rump CDRN and the more radical, Communist-leaning 
members departing for the LDRN (this appears in part to be a result of PCF 
maneuvering to drive a wedge between these camps). 
 If in his Brussels speech Senghor had spoken of colonialism as a modern 
form of slavery, he again explored this theme in his one book-length 
publication, La Violation d’un pays [The Rape of a Land], published in June 1927 
(its preface authored by Vaillant-Couturier). This slim, polemical volume 
relates the bloody history of slavery and colonialism, in a deeply hybrid style 
that mixes the form of the fable with a highly didactic approach, utilizing the 
political language of revolutionary communism: the text is also accompanied 
by 5 simple line drawings designed to reinforce the political message. It 
concludes with the overthrow of the colonial regime by a world revolution that 
liberates not only the colonies but also the metropolitan center from the yoke 
of capitalist imperialism. The resolution of Senghor’s story acts as a form of 
ideological wish fulfillment, the “performance” of an international anti-
colonialism, that imagines the overthrow of Empire through a partnership 
between the colonized “over there” and the workers “over here” (as Sartre 
would write decades later write in Colonialism and Neo-colonialism). Within 
weeks of its publication, however, Senghor’s health faltered, and he would pass 
away just a few months later with the LDRN in turmoil, wracked by arguments 
about finances and political orientation. 
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Remembering Senghor 
How, then, should we remember Lamine Senghor? It would be 
misleading to make grand claims for him as a political theorist. He was, rather, 
a brilliant communicator of ideas, driven by moral outrage at the injustices of 
capitalist imperialism. In political terms, he spent the period between 1924-27 
exploring different potential ways of rallying various forces against empire, 
while recognizing the specificity of the racial oppression suffered by black 
people.  
The political trajectory for anti-colonial figures, such as Senghor, is often 
cast as either a movement from nationalism to communism or, more typically, 
a recognition that communism had no room for the black experience. Yet, 
unlike figures such as George Padmore or Aimé Césaire, Senghor was not 
obliged to make a choice between Pan-Africanism and communism. The 
experience of his successor as leader of the LDRN, Tiémoko Garan Kouyaté, 
constantly in conflict with the PCF hierarchy over the next decade, warns us 
that Senghor may well have struggled to maintain an affiliation to both 
communism and black internationalism. But, throughout his brief career as an 
activist, Senghor believed that these two ideologies could complement each 
other in the quest for black liberation.  
Indeed, perhaps the most productive way of viewing Senghor’s entire 
career as a militant is that of a balancing act in which he veered between 
radicalism and reformism, communism and black internationalism. He 
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consistently kept both his friends and his enemies guessing about his true 
motives and allegiances, as he sought to carve out a political discourse in which 
both race and class might carry equal weight. 
